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This paper summarizes the state-of-the-art on European social policy integration. It summarises 
the controversy over the ‘social dimension of European integration’, which has been ongoing ever 
since the founding fathers of European integration in 1957 agreed that the economies should be 
integrated basically without social regulation to counterbalance liberalisation effects. It presents 
the historical development of EU social policy as well as criteria for evaluating the state of “social 
Europe” and finally discusses how the EU is impacting on different types of welfare states. The 
argument  is  that  the  EU  contributes  to  framework  conditions  that  promote  more  ‘bounded 
varieties of welfare’ in Europe. In other words, it is held that there will be a more restricted 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter discusses the European Union (EU) and its impact on the welfare states in 
Europe.  For  decades,  the  individual  European  states  and  their  welfare  systems  have  been 
compared and categorised in different ‘worlds of welfare’ (Esping-Andersen 1990, Ferrera 
1998). At the same time, they themselves form part of a quasi-federalist quasi-state that has 
some  features  of  a  welfare  state,  the  supra-national  EU.  For  understanding  welfare 
developments  in  Europe  it  is  therefore  indispensable  to  take  into  consideration  the  joint 
promises and pressures that European integration represents. 
Section 1 looks at the ways in which European Social Policy has evolved, including   
•  regulation (in fields such as labour law and working conditions, health and safety 
at the workplace, gender equality and anti-discrimination policies);   
•  distributive  action  (e.g.  via  the  European  Social  Fund)  and  the  initiation  of 
discourse and  
•  mutual  surveillance  among  national  policy  makers  (“open  method  of 
coordination”).  
Section  2  then  summarizes  the  controversy  over  the  ‘social  dimension  of  European 
integration’, which has been ongoing ever since the founding fathers of European integration 
in 1957 agreed that economic issues should be in the centre of the joint project without social 
regulation to counterbalance liberalisation effects. Section 3 presents criteria for evaluating the 
state of “social Europe”. Finally, the concluding Section 4 will discuss how the EU is impacting 
on different types of welfare states and contributing to framework conditions that promote 
more ‘bounded varieties of welfare’ in the EU, that is, a more restricted variety within limits 
that are directly or indirectly imposed or reinforced by European integration. Working Paper No: 03/2009    Page 5 of 27 
 
2. EVIDENCE ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE EU’S SOCIAL DIMENSION  
EU social policy integration started rather slowly but later developed at a higher speed. 
During the early years of European integration, social policy consisted almost exclusively of 
efforts to secure the free movement of workers. National social security systems were co-
ordinated with a view to improving the status of internationally mobile workers and their 
families.  During  the  late  1960s,  however,  the  political  climate  gradually  became  more 
favourable to a wider range of European social policy measures. At their 1972 Paris summit, 
the Community Heads of State and Government declared that economic expansion should 
not be an end in itself but should lead to improvements in more general living and working 
conditions.  They  agreed  on  a  catalogue  of  EU  social  policy  measures  that  were  to  be 
elaborated on by the European Commission (the institution initiating EU policies), the Social 
Action  Programme  1974.  This  was  confirmation  that  governments  now  perceived  social 
policy  intervention  as  an  integral  part  of  European  integration.  Several  of  the  legislative 
measures proposed in the Action Program were adopted by the EU’s decisive Council of 
Ministers in the years that ensued, and further Social Action Programs followed the first one. 
From the mid-1970s onwards, the development of EU social policy was rather impressive — 
at least, from a purely quantitative perspective. 
 
EU Social Regulation 
In 2009, approximately 80 binding norms existed in the three main fields of EU social 
regulation: health and safety, other working conditions, and equality at the workplace and 
beyond  (Falkner  2010).  Additionally,  approximately  90  amendments  and  geographical 
extensions to such binding norms have been adopted (e.g. to new member states). On top of 
these binding EU social norms come approximately 120 non-binding policy outputs, e.g. soft 
recommendations to the member states. 
With regard to equality, one of three major fields of EU activity in the field, matters 
such as equal pay for work of equal value, the equal treatment of men and women regarding 
working  conditions  and  social  security,  and  even  the  issue  of  burden  of  proof  in 
discrimination law suits were, over time, regulated at the EU level (Hoskyns 1996, Ostner and Working Paper No: 03/2009    Page 6 of 27 
 
Lewis 1995). Since the EU’s 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam (new Article 13), a more general 
equality policy has been developed, targeting discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic 
origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation (Bell 2004). 
In the field of working conditions, a number of rules were adopted during the late 1970s, for 
example  on  protection  of  workers  in  cases  of  collective  redundancy,  on  the  transfer  of 
undertakings, and on employer insolvency. Many more followed suit during the 1990s and 
thereafter, including those on worker information, on conditions of work contracts, on the 
equal treatment of atypical (such as shift, temporary agency, or part-time) workers, and on 
parental leave. 
Regarding health and safety at work, finally, regulation was based on a number of specific 
Action Programmes. Directives (norms specified by the EU but to be specified in national 
laws) include the protection of workers exposed to emissions (or pollutants) and responsible 
for heavy loads, as well as protection against risks of chemical, physical, and biological agents 
at work (such as lead or asbestos). These are the three main areas of regulative EU action. 
 
The distributive dimension of EU social policy (in a wider sense) 
The 1957 Treaty had already provided for a ‘European Social Fund’ (ESF). Its goal was 
to  simplify  the  employment  of  workers,  to  increase  their  geographical  and  occupational 
mobility  within  the  Community,  and  to  facilitate  their  adaptation  to  change,  particularly 
through vocational training and retraining. Initially, the ESF reimbursed member states for 
some of the costs involved in introducing and implementing such measures. The first major 
reform of the ESF in 1971 involved the definition of target groups and the co-funding of only 
those  domestic  projects  considered  appropriate  from  a  Community  perspective.  After  a 
number  of  further  reforms,  the  ESF  now  co-finances  projects  for  young  people  seeking 
employment, for the long-term unemployed, for disadvantaged groups, and for promoting 
gender equality on the labour market. The aim is to improve people's ‘employability’ through 
strategic  long-term  programmes  (particularly in  regions  lagging  behind),  to  upgrade  and 
modernise workforce skills, and to foster entrepreneurial initiative. Working Paper No: 03/2009    Page 7 of 27 
 
In addition to the Social Fund, other EU Funds also seek to combat regional and social 
disparities (Allen 2005, Bache 2007). These are the European Regional Development Fund, the 
European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (Guarantee Section), and the Financial 
Instrument for Fisheries Guidance. Additionally, the Cohesion Fund finances environmental 
projects and trans-European infrastructure networks in member states whose gross domestic 
product is less than 90 per cent of the EU average. Finally, the European Adjustment Fund for 
Globalization  aims  to  help  workers  made  redundant  as  a  result  of  changing  global  trade 
patterns to find another job as quickly as possible. It became operational in 2007 with €500 
million  a  year  at  its  disposal,  but  at  least  during  the  initial  period,  the  member  states’ 
authorities made fewer applications than expected. 
In sum, the EU’s social dimension is less regulatory than is often assumed. For 2006, the 
financial perspective heading for “structural operations” claimed 31.6 per cent of the of EU’s 
general budget (Commission 1999: 50). The steering effect of the EU’s labour market policy 
may be somewhat stronger than the ESF figures indicate. The latter display only the EU’s part 
of the overall project budgets, but the actual impact of the EU’s criteria for project selection is 
greater  than  this,  for  national  authorities  often  also  apply  them  bearing  the  prospect  of 
European  co-funding  in  mind.  On  top  of  this  now  come  the  2009  economic  recovery 
spending programs. 
 
The open method of co-ordination 
In addition to the regulative and the redistributive level of EU social policy, the last decade 
has also seen a new instrument being developed, the “open method of coordination” (OMC). 
It  is  an  explicitly  non-regulatory  strategy  based  on  discourse  and  promotion  of  mutual 
learning e.g. via benchmarking. Although similar kinds of practices have existed in other 
supranational/international organisations (Schäfer 2006), this development has rushed a wave 
of political and academic statements expecting harmonisation of domestic policies without 
the imperative of binding EU law.  
The main features of the OMC were developed in the field of EU employment policy. This 
happened initially without a Treaty basis, as a follow-up to the Essen European Council of Working Paper No: 03/2009    Page 8 of 27 
 
1994. The 1997 Amsterdam Treaty's employment chapter later formalised these proceedings 
and  the  EU  has  since  adopted  employment  policy  guidelines  on  an  annual  basis.  Their 
specification and implementation is left to national-level actors so that the domestic situation 
and party political preferences can be taken into consideration. The bottom line is that EU 
member states must regularly present reports on how they have dealt with the guidelines, and 
why they have chosen particular strategies in their ‘National Action Plans’. They have to 
defend their decisions at the European level in regular debates, so that peer pressure comes 
into play and has, at least potentially, a harmonising effect on social policies in Europe (de la 
Porte and Pochet 2002, Goetschy 2002, Mosher and Trubek 2003, Jacobsson 2004). Over the 
years, the open method of coordination has been extended to new fields, including e.g. health, 
pension reform (Natali 2009, Eckardt 2005), equal opportunities (Braams 2007), and social 
inclusion (Schelkle 2003, Daly 2006). 
Its success is still hard to judge due to the lack of reliable data on its practical effects in the 
member states (but see Zeitlin and Pochet 2005, O'Connor 2005, Kröger 2009) and will always 
be difficult to measure since there is no counter-factual basis of comparison at the researchers' 
disposal. It seems plausible to expect that joint policy learning and mutual adaptation will 
have some effects on national policies, and that EU-level obligations, however loosely defined, 
will help governments to justify reforms domestically that they might otherwise not have 
dared to enforce for fear of electoral losses. Where national governments are not ready for 
policy change, however, the National Action Plans may do no more than either restate pre-
existing domestic policies or perform a symbolic function (Scharpf 2002). 
   Working Paper No: 03/2009    Page 9 of 27 
 
3. DEBATES ON THE “SOCIAL DIMENSION OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION” 
Ever  since  the  inception  of  what  later  became  the  European  Union,  the  debates  on 
whether or not a “social dimension of European integration” was either present at all, or 
needed, were lively. The early writings focused on the scarce legal foundations for EU social 
activities (see in more detail Falkner 2007) and were mostly written by legal scholars (for later 
discussions on EU social policy from a mainly, though not exclusively legal point of view, see 
the editions by Shaw 2000, De Búrca et al. 2005). Social policy competences were expected to 
remain a largely national affair in Europe since the dominant philosophy of the 1957 Treaty 
was that improvements in welfare would be provided by the economic growth arising as a 
consequence  of  the  liberalisation  of  the  European  market,  and  not  from  regulatory  and 
distributive forms of EU public policy.  
However,  the  Treaty  contained  a  small  number  of  concessions  for  the  more 
'interventionist' delegations (most importantly, the French). These were mainly the provisions 
on equal pay for both sexes and the establishment of the European Social Fund. This legal 
situation accounts for a number of specificities of social policy among all EU policies: for a 
long time the  EU  possessed  no  explicit  competence  provision  empowering  the  European 
Commission to draft legislative proposals for later adoption by the EU’s Council of Ministers 
and the European Parliament (this would be the common decision-making procedure at the 
EU level). It was only due to the existence of so-called 'subsidiary competence provisions' that 
intervention in the social policy field was – implicitly – made possible, but only if it was 
considered  functional  for  market  integration.  It  is  crucial  to  note  that  from  the  1970s 
onwards, these provisions were used for social policy harmonisation at the EU level. The 
quorum, however, constituted high thresholds for joint action since action by the Council of 
Ministers needed unanimous approval. This state of affairs existed basically until the 1992 Working Paper No: 03/2009    Page 10 of 27 
 
Treaty of Maastricht2, and in some fields, unanimity would even be required if the pending 
Lisbon Treaty ever comes into force. 
This  was  criticized  also  in  the  famous  concept  of  the  “joint-decision trap” in (quasi-
)federalist systems (Scharpf 1988). Where the constituent governments' consent is needed for 
federal legislation, and decisions have to be unanimous or nearly unanimous, a 'pathology of 
interlocking politics' (ibid.: 254) results. Competences are shared (not divided) but at the same 
time,  the  institutional  self-interests  of  the  lower  level  governments  to  preserve  their  veto 
position and hence their sovereignty are not filtered by a representation principle. Stalemate 
and sub-optimal outcomes can be expected from such systems (ibid.: 267). 
When looking at the field of EU social policy, Scharpf's analysis seemed certainly accurate 
by the time of the famous article's publication and far beyond. Nevertheless, a few counter-
dynamics were detected in the ensuing years, and a proper debate on ‘social Europe’ began to 
flourish  during  the  1990s  when  a  prominent  edited  volume  (Leibfried  and  Pierson  1995) 
provided  the  first  encompassing  discussion  on  EU  social policy,  its  development  and  its 
relationship  with  national  policy.  The  volume  investigated  the  dynamics  of  social  policy 
integration by examining, and comparing, the evolution of EU social policy in several areas. In 
overall terms, Pierson and Leibfried saw a "system of shared political authority over social 
policy" emerging (Pierson and Leibfried 1995b: 4). In this system, the power of the member 
states was not only pooled, but also to an increasing extent constrained (ibid.: 7). "What is 
emerging is a multileveled, highly fragmented system in which policy 'develops' but is beyond 
the firm control of any single political authority." (Pierson and Leibfried 1995a: 433) 
However, Leibfried and Pierson also detected a specific dynamic leading beyond the joint-
decision trap. They highlighted that the EU institutions were not simply tools of the member 
states, but that member state power was actually restrained by the autonomous activity of EU 
institutions  and,  in  addition,  by  three  further  limitations:  the  impact  of  previous  policy 
                                          
2 The EC Treaty p r o v i s i o n s   h a v e   b e e n   a d a p t e d   w i t h   t h e   S i n g l e   E u r o p e a n   A c t   ( t h a t   i n t r o d u c e d   q u a l i f i e d   m a j o r i t y  
v o t i n g   f o r   i s s u e s   r e l a t e d   t o   w o r k e r   h e a l t h   a n d   s a f e t y   i n   1 9 8 6 ) ,   t h e   M a a s t r i c h t   T r e a t y   ( i n   t h a t   t h e   t h e n   e l e v e n  
member  states  agreed  far-reaching  additional  competences  and  procedural  reforms,  including  significant 
e x t e n s i o n  o f  q u a l i f i e d  m a j o r i t y  v o t i n g ,  w i t h   a  p a s s i n g  e x c e p t i o n  f o r  t h e  U K  i n  1 9 9 2 ) ,  t h e  A m s t e r d a m  T r e a t y  ( t h a t  
ended the UK opt-out and inserted an employment co-ordination chapter into the EC Treaty in 1997) and finally 
t h e  N i c e  T r e a t y  o f  2 0 0 1  ( t h a t   h o w e v e r  o n l y  c o n t a i n e d  v e r y   m i n o r  r e f o r m s  i n  t h e  s o c i a l  r e a l m ,  s u c h  a s   u n a n i m o u s  
decisions that qualified majority suffices thereafter). Working Paper No: 03/2009    Page 11 of 27 
 
commitments at the EU level; the growth of issue density; and the activity of non-state actors. 
Their book also showed that, at least in some fields, EU social policy initiatives had surpassed 
the lowest common denominator of member state preferences (Pierson and Leibfried 1995a: 
458).  
Whether the multi-level system of shared political authority of social policy (Leibfried and 
Pierson 1995b) did in fact create not only more social activities on the supra-national level 
than  previously  expected,  but  also  ones  that  were  sufficient  to  build  a  functional 
counterweight to the intensified market forces, has always been, and still is, a matter of debate. 
A prominent example for this kind of scholarly controversy was framed around the “half full 
glasses” analogy (Ross 1994, Streeck 1994, Goetschy 1994). 
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4. EV A L U A T I N G   T H E   EU ACTIVITIES IN THE SOC I A L   R E A L M  
Most texts on EU social policy qualify their subject, though surprisingly few do this in a 
fully explicit manner, laying out the yardsticks, the operationalisation and the measurement 
methods. On the basis of an extensive literature review, it seems plausible that at least four 
different evaluation criteria are worth considering (Falkner 2000). First, a major task for EU 
social policy (Barnard 2000) has been closing a number of legal gaps in labour law that were 
introduced or widened by the EU’s Internal Market Programme and its liberalising effect 
across national boundaries. New rules were needed, most importantly in the realm of posted 
workers’ rights in the host country and on the level of European works councils that needed a 
trans-national setup in order to meet the conditions of the enlarged operational basis for their 
enterprises. According to this indicator, the EU performed better than most experts expected 
during  the  early  1990s,  and  all  important  gaps  that  had  been  discussed  at  the  time  have 
meanwhile been  closed.3  However,  more  recent  further  steps  of  liberalisation  in  the  EU’s 
common market have created additional need for labour law clarification, most importantly 
in relation to the cross-border competition of service providers. With the benefit of hindsight, 
the closing of labour law gaps might be an issue of lasting concern because the European 
Union  continues  to  first  instigate  market-making  projects  that  will  eventually  require  re-
regulation in the labour law and/or social spheres as well (Mabbett and Schelkle 2009). 
Secondly,  a  somewhat  more  far-reaching  criterion  for  judging  EU  social  law  is  the 
differential between Commission proposals and Council legislation (note that the European 
Commission initiates all legislative projects on the EU-level, while the Council of Ministers is 
the major decision-taker, nowadays jointly with the European Parliament). There was a huge 
gap between what the Commission presented as potential EU social policy and what was 
actually adopted, during the late 1980s and early 1990s. However, this gap was later almost 
completely filled. Even some of the most controversial projects, on e.g. sexual harassment in 
                                          
3 It should be mentioned that some recent judgements by the European Court of Justice have highlighted areas 
w h e r e   e v e n   o n   t h e   b a s i s   o f   E U   d i r e c t i v e s   e x p l i c i t l y   w a n t i n g   t o   c l o s e   s u c h   g a p s ,   t h e   e f f e c t s   o f   m a r k e t   i n t e g r a t i o n  
on domestic labour laws might need further debate and further legal action (see section 3). Working Paper No: 03/2009    Page 13 of 27 
 
the workplace and on employee consultation in the European Company Statute, have been 
adopted. 
A third indicator of the scope of the EU's social dimension is action taken to prevent 
reductions  in  national  social  standards,  potentially  induced  by  the  increased  competitive 
pressures (sometimes called social dumping) of the single market and the Economic and 
Monetary Union. One possibility to prevent this from happening could have been to agree on 
fluctuation  margins,  which  would  have  stopped  one  country  from  gaining  competitive 
advantages  by  lowering  social  standards.  In  any  case,  such  proposals  were  only  thought 
worthwhile by a handful of academics and politicians in a small number of member states, 
notably in Belgium, France and Germany (Busch 1988, Dispersyn et al. 1990). 
Finally, a fourth evaluation criterion might be the rather small extent to which the EU has 
forged a truly supranational social order. However, it needs mentioning that the EU as a 
quasi-federal system was set up when the member states already had fully-fledged welfare 
states.  Therefore,  policy  pre-emption  was  in  place  (Obinger  et  al.  2005b:  556)  and  the 
functional  need  to  replace  the  domestic  systems  was  neither  undisputable  nor  widely 
accepted. 
In short, it seems that while the EU’s welfare activities perform not too badly if compared 
to  the  more  cautious  demands,  they  clearly  fall  very  short  of  the  more  far-reaching 
conceptions.  What  remains  is  the  suspicion,  shared  by  many  authors,  that  “member 
governments have lost more control over national welfare policies … than the EU has gained 
de facto in transferred authority” (Leibfried 2005: 243, see also Scharpf 1999, Ferrera 2005). 
Beyond this evaluation of the status quo, however, it is hard to see an easy way out of the 
situation. To simply add on to the EU’s tasks exactly that what seems to have gotten lost on 
the national level seems impractical. As a basis for this thought experiment, one needs to 
consider the various forms of EU activities in the field. 
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Table 1: Forms of EU social policy (in very broadest sense; for details, see the next section) 
 
  ISSUE AREAS  MEMBER STATE / EU RELATIONS 
 
A) REGULATION of 
social rights and 
standards 
Mainly: Labour law, health and 
safety at the workplace, equal 
treatment policies. 
Both share competence, EU became of 
increasing importance 1970s – 1990s. 
B) SPENDING for 
social purposes 
Mainly: European Social Fund, 
Globalisation Fund, Agricultural 
Fund, Regional Fund. 
EU expenses minor if compared to 
national welfare systems, but within 




harmonisation in the 
social field 
Mainly: Employment policy, 
pensions, social assistance, 
education. 
EU impact depends on domestic 
willingness; hardly any information on 
de facto effects or proofs of causality. 
D) LIBERALISATION 
of public utilities, 
including social ones, 
at large (in fact, part of 
the EU’s economic 
policy) 
 
Mainly: Employment services, 
energy, transport, postal services, 
but also parts of the health 
industry. 
In fact, economic policies touch the 
“outer ring” of social protection, in 
a wide sense, “the welfare state’s 
protective outer skins” (Leibfried 
2005: 270). 
Member states cannot discriminate 
private actors on the market or exclude 
them, outside a few narrowly defined 
and contentious core areas of public 
interest. 
 
I t   s e e m s   t h a t   o n l y   t h e   f i e l d s   B )   a n d   D )   q u a l i f y   f o r   t h e   a r g u m e n t   t h a t   t h e   E U   s h o u l d   r e -
unite the competences eroded on the domestic levels, since regulative competences in the 
social chapter of the EC Treaty are shared between the member states and the EU, and the 
open method of coordination takes no competences away from the governments, in any case. 
The  thought  experiment  would  then  result  in  B)  more  significant  spending  for  social 
programmes on the EU level, and D) counterbalancing the public utilities liberalisation. The 
latter could lead up to, e.g., a re-monopolisation of employment agencies on the EU level. It is 
an interesting topic for debate, but the fruitfulness is not undisputable in functional terms. 
Neither is a potential EU monopoly for local traffic, it seems. An additional argument to be 
raised is that the liberalisation of public utilities in the social realm at large, as far as it 
happened at all, was founded on the consideration that more competition would be beneficial 
overall. It seems doubtful that the EU-wide majority consensus in this direction has vanished. 
In other words: if there are broadly accepted arguments for liberalisation on the level of the Working Paper No: 03/2009    Page 15 of 27 
 
member states, these arguments will more often than not be valid on the European level as 
well.  Therefore,  the  idea  to  let  the  EU  take  on  board  whatever  was  deleted  in  terms  of 
sovereignty  on  the  national  level  is  hardly  viable.  One  may  question  the  arguments 
underpinning the liberalisation option (and one should discuss some obvious detrimental 
effects), but this would rather be an economic debate than one on appropriate levels of social 
policy. 
Regarding more spending at EU-level, finally, the amount needed to counterbalance the 
pressures on the domestic level set up by various European integration measures is hard to 




Table 2: Impact of European integration on national social spending 
 




Direct  Opening borders and social 
security systems for citizens 
of other EU states:  
-  social transfers no longer 
restricted to “own citizens” 
-  no  longer  consumed 
within state territory. 
a) From the member state perspective, 
this can be costly. 
But: Other countries’ situations are 
similar, reciprocity is possible. 
If not: ECJ provides for (some) protection 
of financial stability of the social security 
systems. 
b) From citizens’ perspective, this offers 








Direct  EMU, 
convergence criteria limit 
deficit spending. 
a) Short-term: restrictive effect on social 
expenses possible, although governments 
are in principle free to cut where they find 
useful, including outside the welfare area. 
b) Long-term: not limiting the budgetary 
deficits might have had an even more 
negative effect on social budgets due to 
the danger of debt payment overload. 
Indirect  Only partial tax 
harmonisation on EU level, 
hence room for tax 
competition between 
member states. 
De facto pressure on nation states to 
lower their taxes (including social security 
contributions) on the mobile economic 
actors. But to be decided on national 
level. 
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This table again shows that taking on board, at the EU level, simply whatever seems now 
outside the full sovereignty (in the widest sense) of the nation states will hardly be an easy 
option. Technically, in the field of welfare expenses, it would mean trying to establish the 
amount of welfare cuts that may have been enacted due to “dumping” processes. However, the 
causality of any cuts in national welfare is hard to establish since there are, beyond inner-EU 
tax competition, also many other potential reasons for specific cuts that may have taken place. 
At the same time, it is hard to set up any EU regime to spend exactly this amount of money in 
such a way as to counterweight this consequence of European integration. 
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5. THE IMPACT OF THE EU ON DIFFERENT “F A M I L I E S ” OF WELFARE 
S T A T E S : VARIEGATED AND DIFFER E N T I A L  
We  have  outlined  how  the  EU’s  social  dimension  has  during  the  past  40  years  been 
developed  more  strongly  than  originally  anticipated  by  both  politicians  and  academics. 
However, evaluations differ a lot regarding the success of the “social dimension” of European 
integration. This concluding section will discuss how the EU is impacting on welfare state 
policies overall, bringing about at least de facto significant pressures towards more bounded 
varieties  of  welfare.  However,  the  ways  are  often  indirect  (below  a)  and  the  effects  are 
differential (below b). 
 
a) The prominent role of unintended and indirect effects 
It has already been outlined that the domestic welfare states are nowadays restrained by 
European integration: Firstly, by having to guarantee free movement of labour within the 
integrated Europe and the related trans-national social security careers with the related EU 
co-ordination rules. Secondly, by having to execute the anti-discrimination policies imposed 
by EU law aimed to support women and minorities with regards to age, racial and ethnic 
origin, religion and belief, sexual orientation, and disability. Thirdly, by having to respect the 
minimum standards laid down in EU regulation for the fields of health and safety at the 
workplace and labour law. Fourthly, by respecting some procedural rules under the open 
method  of  coordination  (see  above)  and  hence  by  regularly  reporting  and  justifying  the 
domestic  choices  in  many  other  fields  of  social  policies.  These  are  all  direct  effects  of 
European integration.  
However, the impact of European integration on domestic welfare states and social policy 
regimes goes far beyond ‘implementing’ such EU social norms (as problematic as that may be Working Paper No: 03/2009    Page 18 of 27 
 
in itself4) since many effects are ‘indirect’ ones, not triggered by explicit EU social policies but 
by secondary effects of economic integration, and/or by jurisprudence of the European Court 
of Justice in Luxembourg interpreting EU law in an extensive and sometimes unexpected way. 
It has been outlined above that economic policies were given pre-eminent status in the 
1957 Founding Treaty. To an extent that increased with liberalisation progress over time, 
competition in the enlarged market imposed pressures on raising taxes and social security 
contributions  from  mobile  production  forces.  During  the  second  half  of  the  1980s,  the 
‘Internal  Market  Programme’  revived  the  European  integration  process,  involving 
liberalisation  measures  even  in  previously  protected  and  partly  even  state-owned 
infrastructures  and  services  of  public  interest  (energy,  telecommunications,  transport, 
employment agencies etc.). Slowly but surely, what can be seen as the outer ring of welfare 
policies (Leibfried 2005) was touched on ever more intensively (Scharpf 2002). A landmark of 
indirect effects on social spending was the 1992 Maastricht Treaty with the commitment to set 
up Economic and Monetary Union. This eliminated national controls on monetary policy 
while in parallel, the Growth and Stability Pact imposed limits on budget deficits and hence 
created pressure for spending cuts (or tax raises, but see below), including in the social realm. 
It is a broadly accepted economic view that all this triggered additional growth that can be 
expected to have allowed for a greater cake to be shared between all Europeans, but at the 
same time authors agree that the open borders reinforced the powers of the more mobile 
production  factors  and  seem  to  have  rather  hampered  the  bargaining  power  of  worker 
representatives. In principle, the size and much of the form of redistribution was still left to 
the member states to decide, but the framework conditions of the decision were no longer the 
same. Welfare states, particularly in the EU, nowadays “remain internationally viable only if 
their systems of taxation and regulation do not reduce the competitiveness of their economies 
                                          
4   It should   b e   n o t e d   h e r e   t h a t   f u l l   e v a l u a t i o n   o f   t h e   s u c c e s s   o f   e x i s t i n g   E u r o p e a n   s o c i a l   l a w   i s   r e s t r i c t e d   b y  
t h e   l a c k   o f   k n o w l e d g e   a b o u t   i t s   p r a c t i c a l   e f f e c t s   i n   t h e   m e m b e r   s t a t e s .   O n e   c o m p a r a t i v e   s t u d y   o f   9 0   c a s e s   o f  
domestic adaptation performance across a range of EU social directives (Falkner, Treib, Hartlapp and Leiber 
2005) h a s   r e v e a l e d   t h a t   t h e r e   a r e   m a j o r   i m p l e m e n t a t i o n   f a i l u r e s   a n d   t h a t ,   t o   d a t e ,   t h e   E u r o p e a n   C o m m i s s i o n   h a s  
n o t   b e e n   a b l e   t o   p e r f o r m   i t s   c o n t r o l   f u n c t i o n   a d e q u a t e l y .   W h i l e   a l l   c o u n t r i e s   a r e  occasional non-compliers, some 
u s u a l l y   t a k e   t h e i r   E U -related duties seriously. Others frequently privilege their domestic political concerns over 
t h e   r e q u i r e m e n t s   o f   E U   l a w .   A   f u r t h e r   g r o u p   o f   c o u n t r i e s   n e g l e c t   t h e s e   E U   o b l i g a t i o n s   a l m o s t   a s   a   m a t t e r   o f  
co u r s e .   E x t e n d i n g   t h i s   k i n d   o f   a n a l y s i s   t o   n e w   m e m b e r   s t a t e s   f r o m   C e n t r a l   a n d   E a s t e r n   E u r o p e   s h o w s   t h a t   E U  
standards all too often remain ‘dead letter’ (Falkner, Treib and Holzleithner 2008). Working Paper No: 03/2009    Page 19 of 27 
 
in open product and capital markets – which implies that, by and large, redistribution must be 
achieved  through  public  expenditures  rather  than  through  the  regulation  of  employment 
relations, and that the costs of the welfare state have to be collected from the non-capital 
incomes  and  the  consumption  expenditures  of  the  non-mobile  population”  (Scharpf  and 
Schmidt 2000a: 336). 
It is certainly difficult to establish the net effect of European integration on domestic social 
policy decisions. However, some accounts hold that the EU, if it was not the real source of 
change, has at least been used as an ‘external justifier’. Particularly, but not only, in Southern 
Europe, the convergence criteria for EMU seem to have served as welcome justification for 
welfare  state  reforms  (Guillén  and  Álvarez  2001,  Sbragia  2001,  Martin  and  Ross  2004, 
Leibfried 2005: 270 with further references). 
Next to indirect effects come unexpected direct effects. The EU’s Court of Justice (ECJ) 
has the final say in the interpretation of EU law. Since the 1970s, it has been influential on a 
number of social policy issues and, at times, has significantly increased the practical impact of 
EU  law  by  its  jurisprudence.  The  equal  treatment  of  women  at  the  workplace  and  the 
protection of worker interests when enterprises change hands are two important examples 
(Leibfried and Pierson 2000). A recent case of “spillover” from market integration to the realm 
of welfare is health care. Originally, this was domestic competence and if a patient requested 
to  receive  a  publicly  financed  treatment  in  another  EU  country  this  needed  advance 
authorisation by the competent healthcare institution. In 1998, the ECJ ruled that healthcare 
was a service and hence subject to the competition law provisions under EU law. National 
health policies were unexpectedly affected by the market freedoms prevailing in the EU’s so-
called internal market more than politicians ever intended (Sindbjerg Martinsen 2009: 11). In 
fact, the European Commission has subsequently been using both the ECJ judgements and 
scientific evidence as authoritative inputs supporting its proposals to widen the regulatory 
competences of the EU in the field (ibid.). 
In general, the field of services provision in the EU’s unified market has raised many 
discussions and from 2004 onwards even some mass demonstrations, following the “Services 
Directive”. Most importantly, because the latter creates inequality for those workers posted to Working Paper No: 03/2009    Page 20 of 27 
 
other member states to whom their (often cheaper) home country regulations apply (Schmidt 
2009:  1).  Most  recently,  further  controversial  ECJ  cases  whose  consequences  will  only  be 
visible in the years to come have touched the borderlines between market freedoms and basic 
social  rights  such  as  union  action.  A  heated  debate  is  ongoing  as  to  their  potential 
consequences  in  terms  of  domestic  social  and  industrial  relations  systems,  in  particular 
concerning the minimum pay of workers and the right to strike if foreign companies that 
deliver services, e.g. in the building sector, do not (need to) apply the rules respected by 
employers (or at least the majority thereof) in the country of work (Scharpf 2009, Joerges and 
Rödl 2008). 
 
b) The differential impact of European integration 
Just like ‘globalization’ has no equal impact on the European welfare states (Sykes et al. 
2001, Genschel 2004: presents a very similar argument), the effects of European integration 
also seem to touch all clusters of welfare states in Europe, though in various ways and degrees. 
The original six EU founding states had welfare systems of the Bismarckian type of work-
based social insurance. Differences were then much smaller not only in terms of structures but 
also of levels. Therefore, harmonization on the EU-level would initially have been easier than 
ever since – but this was ‘a road not taken’ (Scharpf 2002). After the first EU enlargement 
during the 1970s, Denmark, Britain and Ireland had already increased the heterogeneity of the 
EU dramatically. Now one Scandinavian and two Anglo-Saxon types of welfare state were 
within the EU. Plurality increased even further later on, with Southern, further Scandinavian 
and Continental, and then Eastern European reform states becoming members. 
The variety of welfare provision concerning both the funding (employer or/and employee 
contributions, direct/indirect taxes on various sources and groups) and the spending sides 
(universalistic  versus  occupation-related  welfare  systems;  only  basic  social  benefits  with 
means-testing  and/or  also  income-sustaining  transfers  even  from  public  system  sources 
and/or  service  provision  in  the  private  realm  such  as  childcare),  plus  the  differential 
normative assumptions and value judgements involved, made joint EU-level welfare policies 
much more difficult. At the same time, the feedback effects of European integration into the Working Paper No: 03/2009    Page 21 of 27 
 
member  states  were  ever  more  differential,  too.  Large-scale  comparative  studies  that 
systematically take into consideration all roots of EU impact outlined above, for all kinds of 
welfare systems and for all countries, in turn, are lacking and would be extremely demanding 
to coordinate. The basic mechanisms at play for pensions, health care, social assistance and 
migration, however, have been illuminated in Ferrera’s outstanding account of redrawing the 
boundaries of welfare in Europe (Ferrera 2005). 
In overall terms, it seems that the Continental systems are most adversely affected by the 
internationalisation processes inside and outside the EU because their sources of income a 
partly no longer viable. When mobile production forces can easily migrate and flee high 
employers’  contributions  to  social  security,  shifting  the  burden  elsewhere  will  be  hard  to 
prevent (Scharpf 2002). Tax-based systems seem less adversely affected, as long as the citizens 
accept  the  immediate  financial  burden  in  exchange  for  more  social  security  (ibid.).  An 
exception may be Denmark with its largely VAT-based social system, which has also come 
under pressure via the EU’s tax harmonisation efforts (Leibfried 2005). 
What stands to be expected as a likely future trend? Will the EU’s impact be such that all 
pre-existing differences will soon be eroded? This could, in principle, be the case, firstly, 
regarding  the  expenditures  and,  secondly,  concerning  differences  in  the  types  of  welfare 
system. However, empirical data suggest otherwise. Concerning the level of overall welfare 
spending, various empirical studies concluded that a 'race to the bottom thesis' is supported 
neither by spending patterns nor by structural changes, be it on a global level or in Europe 
(Starke et al. 2008, Obinger et al. 2005a: 161, Leibfried 2005: 269-70 with further references, 
Scharpf and Schmidt 2000b). Regarding the development of the welfare regimes (Esping-
Andersen 1990), a ‘blurring’ has been found, e.g. in a study of four open economies over the 
last 30 years (Obinger et al. 2005a: with further references), since some common policy routes 
were pursued everywhere (i.e. activation and workfare in labour market policy, enhanced co-
payments in health insurance, more emphasis on family policy). A similar state characterises 
the specific realm of healthcare systems, with a tendency of convergence from distinct types 
towards mixed types (Rothgang et al. 2005: 187). Working Paper No: 03/2009    Page 22 of 27 
 
A full convergence is neither functionally needed nor politically probable, for adaptation 
seems to generally happen ‘in national colours’ (Risse et al. 2001, Héritier et al. 2001).   I n   t h e  
medium run, it seems therefore likely that the various direct and indirect effects of European 
integration will result in what can be called ‘bounded varieties of welfare’ in Europe. 
Regarding likely future trends in EU-level social policy, it seems that deep political and 
economic cleavages prevent a ‘qualitative leap’ towards “major social transfer programmes at 
the  European  tier  with  a  view  to  enhancing  output  legitimation  and  deepening  social 
cohesion” (Obinger et al. 2005b: 546) and, taken together with the dynamics of ‘social Europe’ 
outlined above, it will most probably bring about continued incrementalism (Ferrera 2005) – 
possibly  with  comparatively  more  judicial  than  strictly  regulatory  impact,  after  the 
enlargements and the Lisbon Treaty.  
However,  discontinuous  development  with  even  a  breakdown  and  replacement  of 
institutions is not impossible in times of abrupt changes (Streeck and Thelen 2005: 9), such as 
we are right now witnessing in the financial market and economic crisis. The EU was not the 
main  source  for  these  problems  so  detrimental  to  the  societies  and  the  welfare  systems 
worldwide (although it could probably have done much more to prevent them) but it is a 
crucial  actor  with  at  least  the  potential  to  win  the  struggle  for  the  containment  of  its 
consequences. At the time of writing, it is unclear what the dimensions and consequences of 
the crisis will be in the long run, but one insight from the development of social policy in 
national federal states comes to mind: “major breakthroughs in the reallocation of powers 
were only achieved through severe external shocks” (Obinger et al. 2005b: 564). 
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